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ABSTRACT
In many developing economies, governments provide limited quantities
of subsidized food rations to their urban population. This paper presents
a positive analysis of the impact of such subsidy systems on the welfare
of heterogeneous individuals within the urban and the rural sectors, when
the urban subsidy is funded through a levy on farmers.

Though such an

intervention has the appearance of a transfer from the rural to the urban
sector, we characterize the conditions under which the opposite happens;
that is, certain groups in the rural sector become better-off due to the
intervention, while some of those in the urban sector become worse-off.
Moreover, the rich turn out to be among the gainers while the poor are
among the losers from the intervention.

Such counter-intuitive outcomes

arise not only because of the general equilibrium effects of the inter
vention, but also because a procurement cum rationing system entails par
ticular types of price discrimination among individuals.

In addition, we

identify systematic patterns between the groups which gain versus those
who lose from the intervention.

DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF RURAL FOOD LEVY
AND SUBSIDIZED URBAN RATIONS

Government intervention in the agricultural sector is ubiquitous.
In developed countries intervention is frequently motivated by considera
tions of ensuring income parity between farm and non-farm households.

In

developing countries. on the other hand, intervention is often based on
the belief that agriculture being the largest single sector in terms of
its share in national income, should be taxed (implicitly or explicitly)
to generate resources for investments elsewhere in the economy.

Another

perhaps equally important consideration is that the food surplus of the
agricultural sector is the main source of food supply to the politically
important urban population consisting of white collar workers in govern
ment and industry as well as the elite blue collar workers in organized
manufacturing.
Clearly, any attempt to ensure that all or a chosen subset of urban
food buyers get special treatment (that is, they are able to buy all, or
part, of their food purchases at prices lower than those which would have
prevailed in the absence of government intervention) will have conse
quences for producers' and consumers' incentives, and for the government
budget, depending on the particular method of intervention used. A be
wildering variety of interventions have been tried in developing coun
tries.

In the extreme case, the state marketing board acts as the monop

olist buyer of food from producers at home, as the sole trader with the
rest of the world, and as the sole supplier of food to the urban consum
ers.

The more common practice, however, is a coexistence of public and
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priyate food distribution systems.
In India intervention has taken several forms at different time
periods. including partial or complete restriction on private food trade
across and within regions. but the government has shown a continuing com
mitment to provide (through the public distribution system) a specified
quantity of food at below market prices to most of the urban population.
In the rural sector, the government has typically promised to purchase
any quan~ity of some crops at pre-announced support prices (thus provid
ing a lower floor to the market prices). but the actual purchases for the
public distribution system have been made at the so-called procurement
prices which are announced immediately prior to each harvest.

Until

recently, the latter prices have been lower than the prices prevailing in
the rural areas during the harvest time (farm harvest price); the govern
ment procurement has thus entailed an element of compulsion.

The price

urban consumers pay for their food rations, called the issue price, has
typically exceeded the procurement price (reflec.ting in part the trans
portation and other administrative costs) but, as one would expect, it
has been below the open market price they pay for the rest of their pur
chases.

In all, therefore, five distinct prices (roughly, in an increas

ing order) could be distinguished:

support price, procurement price,

farm harvest price, issue price, and open market price.
In the debate concerning the impact of such procurement cum ration
ing systems, a common view has been that these schemes transfer income
from farm producers to urban consumers, taxing the producers to the ex
tent of the difference between the procurement price and the farm harvest
price on their sales to government, and subsidizing the urban consumers
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to the extent of the difference between the issue price and the open
market price on their ration purchases.

An opposite view was put forward

by Dantwala (1967, 1976) who holds that "the rise in the post-levy free
market price, consequent upon the withdrawal of a part of stocks from the
market through procurement, more than compensates the farmer for the
"loss" suffered by him from selling the levy portion of the marketed sur
plus to the Government at below the market price" [Dantwala (1976)]. That
is, the government intervention indeed benefits farmers because it raises
the open market price (and hence the farm harvest price) above what it
would have been in the absence of the intervention, and because the
farmers' gains from their sales to the open market more than offset their
losses on the sales to the procurement authorities.

In other words, the

urban rationing system enables farmers to achieve a price discrimination
which they otherwise will not be able to achieve.
This paper presents a positive analysis of the impact of food pro
curement cum rationing schemes on the welfare of different individuals. 1
We base our study on a simple analytical model in which the rural sector
contains individuals with a continuum of farm sizes (ranging from land
less workers to landlords with large farms) and the urban sector contains
individuals with a range of incomes.

Such an explicit treatment of indi

viduals' heterogeneity is essential because, as we shall see, the welfare
effects of an intervention on different individuals within the same sec
tor are markedly different and, therefore, an analysis based on aggregate
sectoral representation can be quite misleading.
In the stylized intervention that we examine, the government buys a
part of the rural food surplus (from farmers who are net food sellers) at
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a price below the market price, and uses this "levy" to provide limited
quantities of subsidized rations to the urban consumers.

Those urban

individuals who wish to consume more food than the ration quantity buy it
in the private food market which receives its supply from the rural sec
tor.2

Our analysis assumes that, at the margin, there is no external

trade in food.

This, we believe, is an appropriate representation of the

unambiguous commitment to varying degrees of food self-sufficiency that
several developing countries (including India) have exhibited in the
past. 3
It is intuitive that the consequences of a procurement cum rationing
scheme are determined, in part, by other policies which are being employ
ed by the government; for instance, policies concerning subsidy or taxa
tion of agricultural inputs (such as fertilizer and power) and non-food
consumption goods, and policies concerning the overall public budget def
icit or surplus.

The present analysis does not deal with commodity taxa

tion,4 and assumes that the government budget concerning the public pro
curement and rationing system is balanced.

This is partly for simplic

ity, but also some of these other aspects have been studied elsewhere in
the literature.

For instance, Sah and Stiglitz (1985) have analyzed the

positive and normative aspects of the disaggregated structure of commod
ity taxes and subsidies in the two sectors but they have abstracted from
policy instruments such as procurement and rations.

On

the other hand,

empirical analyses of specific food subsidy schemes in India in a comput
able general equilibrium framework are available in Narayana, Parikh and
Srinivasan (1984) and de Janvry and Rao (1984), but

these empirical

models for obvious reasons are restricted in the extent of heterogeneity

s
among individuals. as well as in the parameterization of production and
utility functions. 5
Section I describes the basic model in which urban consumers are
precluded from selling their rations in the secondary market.

The cor

responding incidence of welfare effects is studied in Section II. Section
III releases the resale restriction.

The paper concludes with

brief

comments on some of the possible extensions of the model.

I.
Agricultural Sector:

THE BASIC MODEL

An individual's farm size is denoted by

and the distribution function
sizes. 6
size

A

A is

is non-negative.
Z(A) •

Fa(A)

A.

denotes the distribution of farm

The food output of an individual with farm

and his consumption is

xa(A) •

Obviously. these

quantities also depend on prices and government policy but. for notation
al brevity. this dependence is suppressed at present.
ual's net food surplus is denoted by

Qa(A)

=

A rural individ

Z(A) - xa(A) •

which can

be positive or negative depending on whether the individual is a net
seller or buyer of food.

The food surplus is clearly negative for land

less workers and small farmers. and it is positive for large landowners;
we assume that
p.

Qa

is increasing in

A.

The market price of food is

and the price at which the government procures a part of farmers'

surplus is

q.

where

"levy") schedule.

p

> q.

Ga(A)

10

denotes the procurement (or

We postpone a discussion of the schedule

Ga(A)

until

later because. as we shall see. many of our results do not depend on the
specification of this schedule.
If

t = p - q

denotes the difference between the market price and
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the procurement price (that is. the price "wedge"). then the procurement
policy's effect on a farmer is to reduce his full income by

tGa(A) •

A

farmer's utility level and his food surplus are respectively denoted as

a change in

p

and

t

(1)

are

and

where

Aa(A)

denotes the positive marginal utility of income to an
A •7

individual with farm size

Next consider the effect of a change in
food surplus.

Qa.

p

and

t

on a farmer's

It is well known that the effect of a price -change

on a farmer's surplus can not be predicted from the usual restrictions on
the utility function and the technology set.

We take the empirically

supported view that the surplus is increasing in price; that is
Further, the surplus response to a change in

Q: =-~Ga.
come.
~

where

~

t

~

> 0.

can be expressed as

is the surplus response with respect to full in

We assume that food is a normal consumption good.

Consequently,

is negative because a farmer's output is unaffected by his income.

whereas his consumption is increasing in income.

Thus.

that is a larger price wedge leads to a larger surplus.

For later use.

we define the average quantity of food surplus and levy, per member of
the agricultural sector, as

Urban Sector:

An urban consumer can buy up to

of non-tradable food at a price

p - t,

X

subsidized units

and can supplement his consump-

7

8
tion by buying any quantity in the market, at price· p •
a consumer is denoted by
tribution function

F(m} •

m.

The income of

which is distributed according to the dis

Clearly, the self-selecti on of urban consum
(i} The first

ers must imply that there are three groups of consumers:

group consisting of those who consume less food than the ration quantity
X.

per unit of food.

t

They receive a price subsidy of

level and food consumption are denoted as
x(p - t, m}

Their utility

v1 (m} = V(p - t, m} •

and

respectively , (ii} The second group consisting of those

whose food consumption equals

X •

and (iii} The third group consisting

of those consuming more food than the ration quantity.

The effect of
tX

rationing on these individuals is to provide an income subsidy of

v2 (m)

Their utility level and food consumption are, thus, represented by

= V(p.

m + tX) •

and

x(p. m + tX)

respectively .

Intuitively , one would expect that the self-selecti on of a consumer
into one of the above three groups should be systematica lly related to
his income.

This is indeed the case.

In fact, given our assumption that

food is a normal good, it is easily seen that those in the first group
must be poorer than those in the second group, and the latter must be
poorer in turn than those in the third group.

Let

m1

m2

and

denote

the lowest and highest income among those whose food consumption equals
X.

(Of course,

m1

and

m2

depend, in general, on

p,

t

X;

and

this dependence is fully taken into account in the analysis below.)
X

is less

and the income of those consuming more food than

X

is more

Furthermore , we do not need to ascertain ·whether

ml

it follows that the income of those consuming less food than
than

ml

than

m2

.

Then

and

are identical or not (the former situation is simply a special case of

m2
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the latter) because, as we shall see, our analysis does not depend on
this issue.
For brevity, we refer to urban individuals with incomes smaller than
m1

as those belonging to the lower income group. whereas individuals

with incomes larger than

upper income group.

m2

Further

are referred as those belonging to the
x1

and

x2

denote the per capita food

consumption within the lower and the upper income groups, respectively.
That is,

x1

1

=

[1/F(m1 )Jt1Lx(p - t, m)dF • and
m

x 2 = [1/ {1

u

F(m2 )}Jf1 x(p, m + tX)dF,
2
m·

where

(mL, mu)

represents the

support of the urban income distribution.
Equilibrium:
tions, then

n1

If

=

Na

and

NF(m1 )/Na.

N denote the rural and the urban popula
and

n2

= N[l

- F(m2 )]/Na

respectively

represent the urban populations in the lower and the upper income groups,
as proportions of the rural population.

For the moment we ignore the

transportation and administrative expenses associated with the public and
the private distribution systems; these costs are discussed later.

A

balanced budget intervention, thus, implies that the quantity of food
procured in the rural sector should equal the quantity distributed
through the ration system; that is

where

n = N/Na

rural population.

denotes the urban population as a proportion of the
Further, the balance between the food supply and

demand in the market requires

9

p,

The policy variables in the present model are

and

X,

Since these four variables must satisfy two

Ga(A) •

the levy schedule

t,

restrictions represented by equations (3) and (4), any two of the vari
ables can be treated in general as controls; the values to be taken by
the other two being determined by the constraints, given the set values
In the analysis below, the variables

of the control variables.
the schedule

Ga(A)

are treated as controls.
t

specification is that at

vention, regardless of what

II.

= 0,

t

and

The key advantage of this

the above model implies non-inter
and

Ga(A)

X might be.

DISTRIBUTIONAL INCIDENCE

Price and Quantity Effects:

We first investigate the effect of in

tervention on the market price of food.

For brevity, we focus on the

case in which the government introduces a small wedge between the market
and the ration (procurement) prices; that is, the effects of a change in
t

are evaluated in the neighborhood of

t = 0.

As we shall see, the

results to be derived below hold for any levy schedule that the govern
ment might choose.

Also, as we shall note parenthetically , many of the
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results hold even when the existing wedge is not small.
To ascertain the effects of a change in
turbed with respect to
specified.

(p, t, X) ,

treating

This is done in two steps.

with respect to

t

yields

t,

(3) and (4) are per

Ga(A)

as parametrically

First, differentiation of (3)

10

(5)

where

1
x~ = [1/F(m1 )Jf1LxP(p - t, m)d.F

is the average price response of

m

food consumption of urban individuals in the lower income group. 10
x2

later use,

x2

and

p

are defined analogously.

m

are negative, whereas

x2

m

t,

xl
p

and

is positive.

Expression (5) characterizes the change in
ing to a change in

Obviously

For

p

and

X,

correspond

which keeps the government budget in balance.

The change in the ration quantity,

dX/dt,

turns out to be proportional

which is the average price response in the lower income group.

to

This should not be surprising because the food demanded by the lower in
q = p - t,

come group depends on the ration price
symmetrically by changes in

p

and

which is affected

t •

Next, the derivative of the market equilibrium condition, (4), with
respect to

( 6)

t

can be rearranged as

n 2 X 2)

~=

dt

p

The denominator in the above expression represents the effect of a marg
inal increase in the market price

p

on the net market supply; that is,

the price induced increase in the rural supply minus the decrease in the
demand by the higher income group.

The numerator represents the direct

as well as the induced increase (through the effect on

X)

market demand due to a marginal change in the wedge

t •

direct effect of

n2

t

on the market demand (that is,

ambiguous sign because a larger

t

in the net

In general, the

Xx; - Qt)

has an

increases the food demanded by the

11

upper income urban group, but it also increases the supply from the rural
ector.
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Substitution of (5) into (6). evaluated at

t

= 0.

yields

where

(7)

1 2 1

( 8)

A= n n x p - (n

Clearly.

A< 0 because

n 2 X 2)
p

xl

and

p

x2
p

are negative and

is positive.

The sign of the numerator in (7). on the other hand, is ambiguous; the
source of this ambiguity has already been noted earlier. For small values
of

X

(and correspondingly small values of

Ga ).
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however, the ex

pression (7) is positive. and the following conclusion holds.
PROPOSITION 1:

The market price increases in response to an interven-

tion 1 provided the ration size is small.
From an economic viewpoint, a critical sign is that of
Suppose for a moment that this sign were positive.
this would imply

dq/dt

> 0;

From

dp/dt - 1

p - t

=

q •

that is. an increase in the subsidy on

rations actually increases the price at which rations can be s~ld.
Furthermore, if
0.

dp/dt

were to exceed unity in the neighborhood of

=

then a small government intervention is incapable of lowering the

ration price below the market price!
arise in the present case.

21? -

dt

1

=

(n -

This possibility. however. does not

To ascertain this, we obtain the following

from (7)

(9)

t

1

n )[(Q

p

12

Now, let

x;(m)

denote the compensat ed price response of an urban indi

vidual with income
x

2
p

+ Xx

2
m

m.

Then, the standard Slutsky relationsh ip implies

= [1/{1

negative because

X)x ]dF

The last expressio n is

m

x

>X

for

m

> m2

,

and

x;

f

O.

Therefore , the

right hand side of (9) is negative, and the following conclusio n emerges.
PROPOSITION 2:

The increase in the market price is less than propor-

tional to the increase in the wedge between the market and the ration
.
13
price.
Further, since
dX/dt

< 0.

ration size.

That is:

dp/dt - 1

< 0,

it follows from (5) that

A larger price wedge correspon ds to a smaller

This is what we would expect because a larger wedge in

creases the food consumpti on of those consuming below

X.

This in

crease, in turn, requires a reduction in the per capita ration quantity
that can be made available in the urban sector.
It is useful to point out here that the above qualitativ e results do
not depend on the precise character istics of the rural levy schedule
Ga(A) ,

level of

even though the equilibriu m prices and quantitie s (that is, the
p

and

X correspon ding to a given level of

general, on the levy schedule.

t)

depend, in

A noteworth y special case in which the

equilibriu m prices and quantitie s themselve s are independe nt of any mean
preservin g change in the rural levy schedule is when the Engel curve for
food is linear in income.

To see this, first note from (3) and (4) that

the rural variables which influence the equilibriu m are the average levy
(per farmer),

G = /Ga(A)dF a,

and the average surplus,

Q

=

/Qa(A)dF a.
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=Z

Qa

Also, recall that

•Z,

effect on the output,

xa

lish that, provided
in

Ga

not only leaves

unchanged.

- xa(p, -tGa) •

Since the levy has no direct

of a farmer, it is straightforward to estab

is linear in

-tGa,

a mean preserving change

Q unchanged but also, by definition, leaves

From (3) and (4), the equilibrium values of

p

and

G

X are

thus unaffected.
Therefore:

If the Engel curve for food is linear. then any mean

preserving change in the rural levy schedule has no effect on those in
the urban sector; its only effect is on the income distribution within
the rural sector.

We should also note here that this result is useful

even if the Engel curve is linear only within parts of the entire range
of the rural income distribution, as is more likely to be the case in
practice.

In this case, the above result holds for mean preserving

changes in the levy schedule within the range of incomes (farm sizes)
where the Engel curve is approximately linear.
Welfare Effects:

We now ascertain the effects of government

intervention on the welfare of different individuals in the economy.
From (1),

(10)

represents the effect of intervention on the utility of a rural individ
ual.

The corresponding expressions for an urban individual within the

lower and the upper income groups, respectively, are

(11)

=

Ax(l - !ll?)
dt '

and

14

(12)

dv2(m)/dt

where

A(m)

denotes the positive marginal utility of income to an urban

individual with income

m.

For the urban individuals whose food con

sumption is exactly equal to the ration quantity

X,

it is easy to see

that either expression (11) or (12) represents the effect of intervent

.

14

10n • .

In analyzing expressions (10) to (12), we restrict ourselves to
those cases (discussed in th~ previous section) where:

1 > dp/dt > 0.

It is also reasonable to restrict the levy schedule such that the rural
individuals with negative surpluses (that is, landless workers and small
farmers) do not pay any levy, while for others who pay levies, the levy
quantity is always smaller than their surplus quantity.
Ga= 0,

if

Qa

is negative; and

Qa >Ga,

follows then that (10) is negative if
shows that

dV1 (m)/dt > 0.

whose food consumption is

Qa

if

Ga

is negative.

That is,
is positive.

It

Further, (11)

The same is true for those urban consumers
X.

The above results can be summarized as

follows:
PROPOSITION 3:

The urban individuals whose food consumption is not

larger than the ration quantity become better-off due to the intervention,

The landless workers and the small landowners in the rural sector.

on the other hand, become worse-off due to the intervention.
The welfare effects on the rest of the population depend critically
on the precise magnitude of

dp/dt •

For instance, if

dp/dt

is large

(say, close to one) then, from (10) and (12), one would expect all rural
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surplus suppliers to become better-off, and the urban individuals consum
ing large quantities of food to become worse-off.
effects would arise if

dp/dt

The reverse welfare

is small (say, close to zero).

The pre

ceding observation suggests that if the intervention makes a specific
group of individuals better-off, then it must make some other well
defined group of individuals worse-off.

To derive specific results of

this nature, we begin by establishing certain monotonicity properties in
the welfare effects of the intervention.
If a consumer belonging to the upper income

We first show that:

urban group becomes better-off (worse-off) due to the intervention, then
all members of this group who are poorer (richer) than this consumer must
also become better-off (worse-off).

(13)

If

dv2(;)/dt

That is

~ 0 • then dv2(m)/dt ~ 0 for all m 5 m.

The above result is a direct consequence of the fact that

{X - xdp/dt}

is the net income gain (which could be positive or negative) to an indi
vidual in the upper income urban group, from an increase in the subsidy
t

(see expression (12)).

This net income gain decreases with income be

cause an individual's consumption,

x •

increases with income.

There

fore, if the net income gain is positive (negative) for a particular in
dividual then it must also be positive (negative) for those with smaller
(larger) incomes than this individua1.

15

Whether or not a similar monotonicity characterizes the gains or
losses of the surplus sellers in the rural sector depends, in part, on
the nature of the levy schedule
focus on a linear

Ga(A)

Ga(A) •

In the rest of this paper, we

but, as we shall see, our results also hold for

16
certain non-linear schedules.

Specifically. we consider a levy schedule

under which farmers with farm sizes below some level

A0

are not re

quired to contribute to the procurement. and the quantity procured from
those with farm sizes above

A0

is proportional to their farm size.

16

Assuming that food yield is not significantly affected by the farm
size. the food surplus can be expressed as
the food output per unit of land.

Qa

= Az

- xa.

where

z

is

For levy-paying farmers. then.
where.

is the

elasticity of food consumption with respect to land area. ·Further. if
denotes the net profit from unit land.
farmer. and

ea
xm

consumption. then

= alnxa/alnma
ea
xA

=

ma

n

denotes the full income of a

represents the income elasticity of food

(An/ma)ea •
xm

Now

An< ma.

because the net

farm profit is only a part of the full income. which also includes the
value of the labor endowment.

Further. since the income elasticity of

food is typically less than one. it follows that

e:A

< 1.

and

(14)

Thus

PROPOSITION 4:

If the farm size does not significantly affect the

food yield then. under a linear levy schedule. the levy quantity as a
proportion of the surplus sold by a farmer declines with farm size. 17
An immediate consequence of expressions (10) and (14) is that:

!!...!

levYJ?aying farmer becomes better-off (worse-off) due to the interven
tion, then all levy::;paying farmers with a larger (smaller) farm size must
also become better-off (worse-off).

That is

17

The economic intuit ion behind the above result is easily understood.
is the net income gain from intervention to a

dp/dt - Ga/Qa

From (10),

farmer on a unit of surplus and, from (14), this gain increases with farm
size.

Thus, if this gain is positive for a smaller farmer, it must also

be positive for a larger farmer.

Alternatively, if the gain is negative

for a larger farmer, it mu.st also be negative for a smaller farmer.
The above monotonicity properties allow us to derive certain syste
matic relationships between those who gain in one sector versus those who
For brevity in exposition, we define a "repre-

lose in another sector.

sentative" farmer with land area

A,

such that

Ga(A)/Qa(A)

= G/Q

That is, the representative farmer is the one whose levy payment as a
proportion of his surplus is the same as the rural sector's average levy
as a proportion of the rural food surplus.

consumer, with income
such that

x(p,

m2

-2
m

+ tX)

•

=

Analogously, the "average"

in the upper income urban group is defined
x2 •

That is, the average consumer's food

consumption is the same as the mean consumption in the higher income
urban group.

Using these definitions, we establish the following.

(16)

dv2(m)/dt 2, 0

If

then
(17)

If

dVa (A) / d t

dVa(A)/dt 2, 0
then

for any

<0

for any

dv2(m) /dt

<0

-2
mL m •
for all

Ai

A•

A ~ A •

for all

-2
mLm •
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PROPOSITION 5:

(i) If the intervention helps any urban consumer who is

richer than the average consumer in the upper income group. then it must
hurt all leYY:Paying farmers whose farm size is smaller than that of the
representative farmer. and (ii) If the intervention helps any levy-paying
farmer with farm size smaller than that of the representative farmer.
then it must hurt all consumers richer than the average consumer in the
upper income urban group.
The above proposition is established in two steps.

First it is eas

ily seen that the average levy as a proportion of the average rural sur
plus exceeds the per capita ration as a proportion of the average food
consumption in the upper income urban group; that is

(18)

G/Q

> X/x 2

•

This can be confirmed by using (3) and (4), and noting that by definition
x2

> X.

that:

Next, for brevity we denote

if

for any

x(p, m + tX)
m

> iii2

-

I

as

x(m) ,

and show

then

(19)

for all

A

f A.

The first inequality in the above is from (12), the

second inequality arises because

i(m)

is increasing in

inequality is (18), and the last inequality is from (14).

m,

the third

The first and

the last part of the chain of inequalities (19), along with (10), yield
(16).
for any

Using similar reasoning, it can be shown that if
A

f A,

then

dVa(A)/dt LO,

19
a

!!J?>~> Q.>L>
Q
2

(20)

d t - Qa(A) -

for all

2 •
m1m

x

-

X
x(m)

'

Taking the first and the last part of the above, and

using (12), one obtains (17).
To see the economic content of the above proposition , first consider
the expression (16).

An urban consumer at the higher end of the distri

bution of incomes (who obviously consumes more food than the ration quan
tity) can gain from the intervention only if the rise in the market price
is relatively small, so that the gains to this consumer from subsidized
rations exceed his loss from the increased price he pays on the food pur
chased from the market.

But if the rise in the market price is small,

then it must also be the case that (i) the relatively poorer urban con
sumers, who buy even smaller quantities of food in the market, are
better-off, and (ii) levy-paying farmers with smaller farms are worse
off, because their gain (from the increased market price) on the sale of
surplus is inadequate to compensate for their loss on the quantity col
lected from them as levy.

Expression (17) can be understood in a similar

manner.
The conflict between the gains and losses of different groups can
be seen much more sharply in a simplified specificatio n in which there
are only two (internally homogeneous ) income classes in each sector.
Specificall y, the.rural sector consists of landless workers (who are net
food buyers and, obviously, do not pay any levy) and landlords (who are
surplus suppliers and pay a levy), and the urban sector consists.of the
poor (consuming less food than the ration quantity) and the rich (consum
ing more food than the ration quantity).

In this special case, Proposi-

20

tions 3 and 5 imply that:

(i) The intervention hurts the landless work

ers and helps the urban poor, and (ii) Of the remaining two groups (the
urban rich and the landlords) one must become better-off while the other
must become worse-off due to the intervention.

Thus, in the case where

the urban rich become better-off due to the intervention, it is appropri
ate to characterize the intervention as a transfer from the rural to the
urban sector.

On

the other hand, if the urban rich become worse-off then

the welfare incidence turns out to be quite unexpected:

the intervention

entails a transfer from the rural poor and the urban rich to the urban
poor and the rural rich.

The transfer in this case is from those who are

net buyers of food in the market to the net food sellers and to those not
involved in the market at all.

III.

TRADABLE RATIONS

It was assumed in the preceding analysis that the ration recipients
can not or do not resell their rations.

This specification depicts the

official policy (or more accurately, the belief of policy makers) which
accompanies typical public distribution systems.

However, individuals

often have strong incentives to buy and sell rationed goods in under
ground (illegal) markets.

In this section, we briefly examine the case

in which rations are provided only to urban individuals below some income
level (~ay,
dary markets.

m1 ),

but there is unrestrained trade of rations in secon

Since tradable rations entail a direct income gain, it is

apparent that the government intervention, in this cas~, is equivalent to
an income tax on farmers and a uniform income subsidy to those urban in
dividuals who receive rations.
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Let

n1

n2

and
m1 •

income level

denote the urban populations below and above the

respectively, as proportions of the rural popula

tion.18

We refer to these two groups as the lower and upper income urban

groups.

Also, for

h

=1

and 2, define

xh •

x!

and

to represent

x!

the average food consumption, and the average price and income response
The balance between

of food consumption, within the two urban groups.

supply and demand within the public distribution system requires:
G

=

n 1 x.

The corresponding balance in the market is given by

The welfare effect of the intervention (that is, of introducing the
t)

price wedge
(10).

on the rural population continues to be expressed by

The utility levels of individuals in the lower and the upper in

come urban groups. respectively, are:
V2

= V(p,m)

•

v1 = V(p.

m + tX)

and

The corresponding welfare effects of the intervention are

represented by

(22)

(23)

dv2(m)/dt

= - b !ll?
dt

•

A perturbation in (21) with respect to

(p, t)

yields

(24)

The denominator in the above right hand side is positive.
tor, recall that

1
xm

>0

and that

In the numeraIt is obvious
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thus that the sign of

dp/dt

is ambiguous in general, and that this sign

depends critically on the magnitudes of the income responses in the rural
sector, compared to those in the lower income urban group.
The above dependence of the induced change in the market price on
the relative income effects is intuitive because of the income transfers
(from the rural sector to the lower income urban group) which is being
attempted through the present intervention.

Further, note that both the

urban rich as well as the rural poor(for whom, it will be recalled,
Qa

< 0.

and

Ga= 0)

are net food buyers in the market.

Not surpris

ingly, therefore, expressions (10) and (23) show that the rural poor as
well as those in the upper income urban group are hurt (helped) by the
intervention if it raises (lowers) the market price.
For the remaining two groups (that is, levy-paying farmers and the
members of the lower income urban group) there is a conflict in the di
rection of welfare effects.

If

dp/dt

is negative then, from (10) and

(22), the levy-paying farmers lose and the lower income urban individuals
gain. If

dp/dt

are less obvious.

is positive, on the other hand, then the welfare effects
To obtain a better understanding, therefore, we con

duct an analysis similar to the one in the concluding parts of the last
section.
From (21) and the public distribution system's budget balance (that
is,

m1

G = n1 X ),

it is easily ascertained that

X/x1

> G/Q.

Next. let

be the income at which an urban consumer's food consumption is

x1 •

Then, using (10), (13), (15) and (22), the following relationships are
obtained, the interpretation of which should now be apparent.
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PROPOSITION 6 :

If

(25)

dv1(m)/dt i 0
then

If

(26)

dVa(A)/dt

dVa(A)/dt i 0
then

-1
mi m •

for any

>

for all

for any

1
dV (m)/dt

>0

A

LA

A

LA •

for all

m

i

-1
m

•

An implication of the above result is that if a farmer at the upper

end of the land distribution is worse-off due to the intervention. then
all urban consumers at the lower end of the income distribution must be
better-off. On the other hand, if one of the latter individuals is worse
off then the former set of individuals must be better-off.
If the Engel curve for food is linear. then (24) yields
dp/dt
sult:

=0

•
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and expressions (10). (22), (23) lead to the following re

With tradable rations and a linear Engel curve for food, interven-

·
k t price.
h as no e ff ec t on t he mare
.
t 10n
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It helps those urban individ-

uals who receive rations, hurts levy::-paying farmers, and leaves other
individuals in the economy unaffected,

In this case, therefore, inter-

vention implies a transfer from the rich farmers to the poor urban
consumers.

IV.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper has undertaken a positive analysis of the distributional
effects of food procur~ment cum rationing schemes.

We have pointed out

many of the circumstances under which such schemes have unexpected over
all incidence on the welfare of different groups of heterogeneous indivi-
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duals; that is. those individuals who were "intended" to be helped by the
intervention end up being hurt.

Furthermore. we have established results

which show that specific groups of individuals must become worse-off due
to the intervention, if some other well-defined groups become better-off,
and vice-versa.

To keep our analysis simple, however, we have abstracted

from a number of important issues.
For instance. our specification assumes that the government budget
concerning the procurement cum rationing scheme is balanced.

Also, we

have not attempted an analysis of the role of underground (illegal)
transactions- in rations and that of bureaucratic corruption in public
distribution systems; instead, we have analyzed two polar cases. one in
which there is no secondary trade in rations and another in which there
is unhindered secondary trade.

Another important aspect from which we

have abstracted is that of administrative costs (that is, storage. trans
portation and other costs) associated with the maintenance of the public
distribution system.

We close this paper with brief remarks on the role

of such costs.
What matters for an analysis such as ours is not that there are ad
ministrative costs. but how do such costs for the public food distribu
tion system differ from the corresponding costs for the private distribu
tion system.

Our conclusions remain unaltered if the administrative cost

of handling a unit of food in the public system is not significantly
different from that in the private system. If on the other hand this cost
is significantly larger for the public system (as has sometimes been
alleged to be the case. because of bureaucratic inefficiencies). and if
this "excessive" cost is allocated to both sectors (that is, if the pro-
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curement price is lowered and the price at which rations are sold is
raised)

then it is natural to expect that there are fewer gainers and

more losers from intervention than those identified in the preceding
analysis.

In fact, if the public system's administrative costs are suf

ficiently larger than those of the private system, then in principle it
is possible that a procurement cum rationing scheme is Pareto worsening.
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FOOTNOTES

1

we should stress that it is not our aim here to argue for or against

such schemes. but we believe that a clearer understanding of their impli
cations is needed in assessing such arguments.
2 we

do not consider here other mechanisms to distribute subsidized food

in the urban sector. such as queues or multiple pricing of rations (under
which different quantities of rations are made available at different
prices which increase with the total quantity of rations purchased by an
individual).

The latter type of schemes have been used in some coun

tries; Gavan and Chandrasekera (1979). for instance, calculate the effect
of such a scheme in Sri Lanka on aggregate producers' and consumers' sur
pluses.

For a comparison of outcomes of distributing limited quantities

of goods through queues, rations, market and some other allocation
systems, see Sah (1986).
3

If there is external trade in food (at the margin) and if the country is

not "small" in the world food market then, in addition to the domestic
responses of intervention considered in this paper, one would have to
consider the world's response.

On

the other hand, if the country is

small in the world food market then the effects of intervention on the
domestic food price (on which some of the previous debates have focussed.
and which forms a central part of the present analysis) are missing. un
less the government introduces a change in food tariff contemporaneously
with the intervention.
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4 we should point out however that our analysis remains unaltered in the
presence of commodity (or other) taxes, provided the procurement cum
rationing scheme does not have a significant effect on the government
revenue from these other taxes and on the non-food prices faced by indi
viduals.
5

Among other recent studies on food policy are Gittinger~- (198S)

and Taylor

!tl....!.!- (1983).

Guesnerie and Roberts (1986) have addressed

somewhat different questions; for instance, the characterization of some
of the conditions under which rationing is Pareto improving.

For several

reasons (such as the presence of a levy schedule), their model does not
apply to the intervention presently under consideration; specifically, we
show later that a procurement cum rationing scheme can not be Pareto im
proving.

We should also mention here the papers by Chetty and Iha (1984)

which examine the characterization and the existence of equilibrium in an
economy with subsidized rations (in the background of open markets) in
many commodities.
6

By farm size, we mean cultivated area.

The tenurial arrangements by

which a farmer attains his cultivated area may influence his welfare and
consumption.

We abstract from these and other complexities such as the

heterogeneity of land quality.
7

Unless stated otherwise. a subscript denotes (throughout the paper) the

variable with respect to which a partial derivative is being taken.
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8It is
easily possible to work with a more general formulation in which
the unit subsidy on the urban rations differs from the unit tax on the
rural levy quantities.
focuses, however, remain

The qualitative issues on which the present paper
largely unaffected by this extension.

9

Toe induced effect that the intervention might have on the intersector al

population migration is ignored in this paper.

It is possible, however,

to embed a migration mechanism within the present model.

See Sah and

Stiglitz (1985) for such models in the context of urban-rural pricing and
commodity taxation.
10

Note that

xl
p

is different from the partial derivative of

x1 ,

be-

cause the latter would also include the derivative of the upper limit of
integration .,

12

In which case, in the numerator in the right hand side of (7), the term

2 - Q
n 2.xxm
t
13

2 = n2.xxm

/xaGadFa
m

is negligible compared to the other term.

This result holds for a range of positive values of

t.

In fact, it

can be verified that a sufficient condition for it to hold is

14

If the societal welfare were to be represented through a Bergson

Samuelson social welfare function, then it is apparent that the aggregate
impact of an intervention can be assessed from (10), (11) and (12).

This

aggregate impact, in turn, can be analyzed to identify the qualitative
properties of socially optimal intervention .

However, as mentioned

earlier, the present paper does not undertake a normative analysis.
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x(p, m + tX)

Formally, if

dV2 (m)/dt

(12) shows that:

f(m)

>0

> dp/dt,

X/x(m)

turn, means

is denoted (for brevity) as
implies
for

> 0.

for

m

< m.

< m,

> dp/dt

then

This, in

because the food consumption

Using (12), once again, it follows that

is increasing in income.

dV2 (m)/dt

m

X/i(m)

i(m) ,

A parallel argument can be used to estab

lish the rest of the expression (13).
16
This is akin to a proportional land tax above a certain farm size.

For

a discussion of the administrative and informational considerations concerning land taxation, see Sah and Stiglitz (1985).
17

This result holds for certain nonlinear levy schedules as well.

To see

this, note that
is the elasticity of the procurement quantity with res
pect to the farm size.
if

sGA

i

1,

Since

s:A

< 1,

it is apparent that (14) holds

and it may hold for values of

sGA

larger than one as

well, provided they are not too large.

18

m1 ,

Note that

n1

and

n2

defined here do not bear any relationship

to those in the earlier sections.

In particular,

m1

here is a policy

choice, whereas it was an endogenous variable in the preceding analysis.

19

Because

Oi

= Gx!,

and

1
x! = ~ .

Accordingly, the numerator in the

right hand side of (24) is zero.
20

This effect is parallel to that in the transfer problem in interna

tional trade where, as was originally pointed out by Ohlin (1929), inter
country income .transfers do not affect the terms of trade when Engel
curves are linear.
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